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Legal Determinants of External Finance Revisited:  The Inverse 
Relationship between Investor Protection and Societal Well-being 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates relationships between corporate governance traditions and 
quality of life as measured by a number of widely reported indicators.  It provides an 
empirical analysis of indicators of societal health in developed economies using a 
classification based on legal traditions.  Arguably the most widely cited work in the 
corporate governance literature has been the collection of papers by La Porta et al. 
which has shown, inter alia, statistically significant relationships between legal 
traditions and various proxies for investor protection.  We show statistically 
significant relationships between legal traditions and various proxies for societal 
health.  Our comparative evidence suggests that the interests of investors may not be 
congruent with the interests of wider society, and that the criteria for judging the 
effectiveness of approaches to corporate governance should not be restricted to 
financial metrics. 
 
Introduction 
The most influential (Solomon, 2007) contribution to the literature on corporate 
governance is that made in a series of papers by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1996, 1997a, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006 
and 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   The extent of their contribution to the field of 
finance, in particular, is exceptional.  According to “in-cites” (an editorial component 
of Essential Science Indicators published by Thomson Scientific) the four most 
influential authors in the world in the area of economics and banking in 2007 were 
Shleifer (with 3,765 citations), Lopez-De-Silanes (with 2,396 citations), La Porta 
(with 2,394 citations) and Vishny (with 1,531 citations). Each of these authors has an 
ISI Web of Knowledge rating of “highly cited”, and in a recent classification of the 
most cited articles in finance from 2000-2006, three of the top five papers are 
contributions by this group (Keloharju, 2008).  Their key papers have influenced 
research across disciplinary boundaries being “some of the most-cited pieces in 
economics, finance, and law” (Siems, 2005).   
 
They investigated, in particular, relationships between legal traditions and corporate 
governance systems, especially with regard to differing levels of investor protection 
and their consequences.  Their early papers (La Porta et al., 1997a and 1978) were 
based on the proposition that financial development was promoted by a legal system 
which protected outside investors against appropriation by insiders;  and they viewed 
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this argument, following Jensen and Meckling (1976), as a natural consequence of a 
“contractual view of the firm” (La Porta et al., 2008). 
 
It is arguable that their work has contributed to a marginalization of the stakeholder 
approach to corporate governance; instead, discussion of the topic tends to be 
dominated by an agency theory perspective.  Furthermore, their work has played a 
significant part in the development of a conventional wisdom that the “Anglo-
American” shareholder-value oriented form of corporate governance is the model to 
which other jurisdictions should conform (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2008; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Collison, 2003; Hansmann and Kraakman,  2001). Their 
statistical analysis has shown that the origin of a country’s legal system, in particular 
whether it is based on a civil or common law tradition, is significantly associated with 
levels of investor protection, and the degree to which its capital markets are 
developed. They show that countries sharing a common law legal tradition (such as 
the UK, the US and the other developed English-speaking economies) have greater 
levels of investor protection, larger capital markets with more dispersed ownership, 
and a greater propensity for funds to be committed to new enterprises by external 
investors.  In La Porta et al. (1998) they also draw on other literature to show that 
such phenomena are associated with greater economic growth.  In more recent work 
however La Porta et al. (2008) noted, citing Glaeser at al. (2004),  that “the evidence 
on the relationship between institutions and aggregate growth more generally, which 
seemed substantial a few years ago, has been crumbling” (p.302). Notwithstanding 
this observation, the main edifice of the La Porta et al. work is regarded as robust by 
the authors: “our framework suggests that the common law approach to social control 
of economic life performs better than the civil law approach” (La Porta et al., 2008, 
p.327). 
 
In this paper we revisit some of the key statistical findings reported by La Porta et al. 
and reveal that the civil and common-law traditions also show statistically significant 
associations with various measures of societal well-being.  We call into question the 
criteria used by La Porta et al. for assessing "poor" laws,  by taking a broader 
perspective on a country’s performance than the one based on financial and economic 
metrics.  We also consider the differences between common and civil law to suggest a 
rationale for the results that we find, and for those reported by La Porta et al.; in 
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particular we draw on arguments developed by Berle and Means regarding the 
provenance and implications of civil and common-law traditions.  Our main focus in 
this paper is on two of the earlier La Porta at al. papers, especially La Porta et al. 
(1997a) and also La Porta et al. (1998).  Not only are these two of their most cited 
pieces of work, but the structure of the 1997 paper serves as a convenient basis for the 
statistical comparison that is at the heart of this paper.  While our main focus is on the 
1997 paper we will also adduce perspectives and more recent findings from their later 
work1 especially La Porta et al. (2008).   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section of the paper we outline relevant 
parts of the La Porta et al. work and consider evidence of their influence in the 
corporate governance literature.  The subsequent section considers the relevance of 
social indicators as a method of assessing countries’ well-being, and reports our 
analysis of certain indicators using the same method of country classification (i.e. one 
based on legal origin) as that used, in particular, by La Porta et al. (1996, 1997a and 
1998). In that section we reproduce material contained in La Porta et al. (1997a). The 
penultimate section considers possible explanations for our findings based on the 
nature of the common and civil law legal traditions.  The final section concludes. 
 
 
Common and civil law legal traditions and the work of La Porta et al.  
 
In the introduction to this paper, we suggested that the work of La Porta et al. lends 
itself to normative arguments in support of an approach to corporate governance 
based on a narrow agency theory perspective.  This is consistent with the Anglo-
American, shareholder value-based model of capitalism as opposed to a stakeholder 
or social market-based approach.  The “varieties of capitalism” literature (see, for 
example, Hall and Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000, 2006, Hutton, 1995; 2003) is extensive 
and a substantive review of it would go beyond the scope of this paper.  But it seems 
                                                      
1 As pointed out in the La Porta et al. body of work, especially La Porta et al. (2008), some refinements 
have been made by the authors to the variables which they used in the 1997a and 1998 analysis.  We 
think that it may be helpful if the figures which we quote from La Porta et al. (1997) are identifiable 
from that classic paper. Therefore in this paper we have reproduced some of the 1997 data as originally 
published; i.e. without adjustment for the subsequent refinements.  We do not believe that updating La 
Porta et al.’s earlier data would have any bearing on the evidence and the arguments that we put 
forward in the current study.   
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apposite to note that, in their much cited work, Hall and Soskice (2001) take a “firm-
centered” approach and regard “companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist 
economy” (p. 6). They apply micro level concepts to help understand the macro 
economy. Hall and Soskice draw a distinction between the two types of political 
economies, which they term respectively: liberal market economies and coordinated 
market economies.  While they describe these ideal types as “poles of a spectrum” 
they broadly correspond to the classification used in this paper between Anglo 
American and social market forms of capitalism.  La Porta et al. (2008, p.303) cite the 
observation from Pistor (2006) that “all the liberal market economies in the OECD are 
common law countries, and all the coordinated ones are civil law ones.”  They then 
add “The literature on the variety of capitalisms has long looked for an objective 
measure of different types; perhaps it should have looked no further than legal 
origins.” 
 
 
We should emphasise that La Porta et al. do not themselves adversely compare the 
generic “stakeholder model” of capitalism with the “shareholder model”; at least they 
do not do so explicitly.  It is a question on which they appear to be silent: certainly the 
term “stakeholder” does not appear in any of their papers which are cited above.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) do note "several important topics closely related to 
corporate governance that [their] article does not deal with" (p.740).  These are "the 
foundations of contract theory", the "basic elements of the theory of the firm", 
“noncapitalist ownership patterns” (although they state that “we pay some attention to 
cooperatives”) and certain functions of “financial intermediaries”.  Given this careful 
exclusion of “important topics” related to corporate governance their silence on 
stakeholders in conventionally owned firms is a rather deafening one.  
 
In their widely cited survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were 
very clear regarding their criteria for judging corporate governance:   
“Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightforward agency 
perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and 
control.  We want to know how investors get managers to give them 
back their money.” (p.738).  
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They go on to make clear that they regard the principal question in relation to 
corporate governance systems as being not whether particular governance systems 
should be copied, but rather how external providers of finance can be provided with  
legal protection such that large-scale financing of entities can develop.  They 
emphasise that this is not the case in many developing countries, nor in some “rich 
European countries” (p.738).  Elsewhere in their paper they assert that “The 
fundamental question of corporate governance is how to assure financiers that they 
get a return on their financial investment.” (p.773, emphasis added) 
 
Shleifer and Vishny emphasised the absence of a basis on which to judge corporate 
governance models.  For example, in relation to the United States, Germany and 
Japan, they state that “all these economies have the essential elements of a good 
corporate governance system”, and that “the available evidence does not tell us which 
one of their governance systems is the best” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.739, 
emphasis in original).  The ensuing body of work from La Porta et al. does go on to 
develop a view of which system, based on levels of investor protection, is best, and 
that, as indicated above, turns out to be a common-law system (corresponding to the 
Anglo American version of capitalism).   
 
La Porta et al. (1996/1998 – hereafter 19982) investigated the legal rules offering 
protection to shareholders and creditors in 49 countries. They examined the origin of 
these countries’ different legal systems, and the extent to which shareholders’ and 
creditors’ rights were enforced.  Their basic classification of legal systems was 
twofold – those comprising common law with English origins and those based on 
civil law deriving from Roman law.  They further classified the civil tradition 
countries (drawing on Reynolds and Flores, 1989), into the “three major families”: 
French, German and Scandinavian legal traditions.  They noted that English common 
law and the French and German varieties of civil law had spread to many other 
countries through a variety of mechanisms including colonialism and "more subtle 
imitation".  The number of countries in each group was, respectively: 18 in the 
                                                      
2 La Porta et al. (1998) is the later (published) version of a working paper  which appeared  in 1996.  
The 1996 version is referred to in the 1997a paper, the latter being to an extent a development of it.  
The sequence of the La Porta et al. work may not be apparent unless this is made clear.  As indicated in 
the text our main focus in the current paper is La Porta et al. (1997a). 
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English origin group; 21 in the French origin group; six in the German origin group; 
and four in the Scandinavian group. 
 
Their investigation of legal regimes showed that common law countries generally 
offer stronger legal protection for investors than their civil law counterparts.  
Amongst the civil law groupings the weakest legal protection for investors was found 
in the French civil law countries, with the German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries in between the French civil law and common law groups.  Another key 
finding reported by La Porta et al. (1998) was that weaker investor protection is 
associated with more concentrated share ownership.  Consequently, they hypothesized 
that stronger legal protection is likely to mean that a larger proportion of shares will 
be held in the form of minority holdings by diversified shareholders. 
 
The latter hypothesis is supported by the findings reported in La Porta et al. (1997a) 
which show that countries with weaker investor protection have "smaller and 
narrower" capital markets for both equity and debt.  They highlight the French civil 
law countries as having "both the weakest investor protections and the least developed 
capital markets" (p. 1131) especially as compared with common law countries. 
 
La Porta et al. acknowledge (1997a) that they have refrained from asking "deeper 
questions" about why differences exist between common and civil law countries in 
relation to investor protection.  (Although La Porta et al (2008) does include a 
searching exploration of the historical antecedents of the common and civil law 
traditions.)  They pose the question:  “what is it about the civil law family, and 
particularly about the French civil law sub family, that accounts for the relative 
unfriendliness of laws to investors?” (p. 1149).  Their speculations include the 
possibility of pure coincidence, or active legal design aimed at keeping "investors 
relatively weak, and to assure family firms and the state a larger role in economic 
development?"  They also speculate about whether "poor laws are just a proxy for an 
environment that is hostile to institutional development" and, drawing on evidence in 
La Porta et al. (1997b), suggest that countries which have low levels of trust among 
their citizens have less effective institutions.  In particular they wonder whether "some 
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broad underlying factor, related to trust" may influence all institutions in a country 
including legal systems and capital markets3.   
 
In La Porta et al. (1998) the authors also seek to place their findings in a wider context 
and pose "the ultimate question" of "whether countries with poor investor protections 
… actually do suffer (p. 1152).  This question is partially answered by reference to 
work  cited by King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) who found that 
“developed debt and equity markets contribute to economic growth”.  They also cited 
evidence from Levine (1998) who confirmed the King and Levine as well as the 
Levine and Zervos’ findings when the analysis was extended to incorporate a La Porta 
et al. “legal origin variable”.  They also cited Rajan and Zingales (1998) who found 
that growth in capital intensive industries was related to the level of development of 
financial systems.  Thus, La Porta et al. (1998) identified a link from the legal system 
of a country to its level of economic development, while acknowledging that the 
obstacles to growth created by poor investor protection had not prevented certain 
countries (they mention, in particular, France and Belgium) from becoming rich.  The 
evidence regarding the link between legal tradition and economic growth has been 
reassessed by La Porta et al. (2008) but, ten years later, their perspective on the 
significance of legal regimes was summed up as follows: 
In sum, there is by now a great deal of evidence that legal origins 
influence legal rules and regulations, which in turn have substantial 
impact on important economic outcomes—from financial development, 
to unemployment, to investment and entry, to the size of unofficial 
economy, to international trade. Much of this evidence suggests that 
common law is associated with better economic outcomes than French 
civil law. The evidence also shows that legal origins influence patterns 
of growth within industries, but it is less clear that legal origins predict 
aggregate growth. The last finding resonates with the obvious 
observation made by LLSV (1998) that countries like France and 
Belgium achieved high living standards despite their legal origin. (La 
Porta et al., 2008, p.302). 
 
In this paper we take issue with the criterion, namely economic growth, used by La 
Porta et al., at least in their earlier work, to address the “ultimate question” of whether 
countries with poor investor protection “do suffer”.  The fact that subsequent evidence 
                                                      
3 In his examination of happiness, Layard (2005), drawing on Putnam (2000)  reported that in 
continental Europe “levels of trust have improved (or not fallen) in every country since 1980” whereas, 
over a broadly comparable period, levels of trust had steadily declined in the UK and the US.   
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on that specific issue is unclear is beside the point.  We take a broader social 
perspective in which economic growth is regarded as a means to an end, not an end in 
itself.  Answer to our “ultimate question” relies on the criterion of societal well-being 
rather than the “better economic outcomes” referred to by La Porta et al.  Of course 
there may not be a clear consensus on how societal well-being should be measured, 
although the same argument could be advanced about economic growth.  There are, 
however, increasingly widely reported and authoritative social indicators which do 
inform such judgments (see, for example, the United Nations’ annual Human 
Development Reports and UNICEF’s annual  State of the World's Children Reports).  
In the next section we shall briefly discuss the development and use of social 
indicators and argue that they reveal a very different perspective on the relative 
performance of common and civil law countries from that put forward by La Porta et 
al. 
 
Social indicators and an extension of the La Porta et al (1997) analysis 
This section draws on the literature of social indicators and also on the insights of 
Gray (2002) who suggested that social accounting may be “usefully thought of as the 
universe of all possible accountings”.   From that perspective, economic and financial 
indicators, whether micro or macro, may be characterized as very constrained subsets 
of a potentially much broader and informative social accounting.   
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a ‘social indicators movement’ arose as a result of the 
perceived inadequacy of the information available to policy makers (Carley, 1981; see 
also Glatzer, 1981).  The suitability of macroeconomic metrics as indicators of 
societal welfare was increasingly questioned based on a growing body of research 
(see, for example, Christian, 1974; Galnoor, 1974; Goeke, 1974; Liu, 1974; Seashore, 
1974).  The field of enquiry into social indicators burgeoned and the early 1970s saw 
the inception of the specialist journal, Social Indicators Research.  Indeed, only a few 
years later, Glatzer (1981) stated that its “breadth and diversity” meant that “no one 
social scientist can hope to provide an adequate survey of the relevant literature."  By 
1976 the OECD had reported that: 
“growth is not an end in itself, but rather an instrument for creating 
better conditions of life [and] increased attention must be given to the 
qualitative aspects of growth, and to the formulation of policies with 
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respect to the broad economic and social choices involved in the 
allocation of growing resources”  (OECD, 1976, p.7) 
Examples of “macro” applications of social accounting are not numerous in the 
accounting literature but a small set of studies which explicitly considered macro 
social indicators appeared in a special section of Accounting Organizations and 
Society in 1981.  The special section, which was introduced by Dierkes (1981) was 
“devoted to the memory” of a particular scholar, Raymond Bauer, who, anticipating 
Gray’s perceptions on social accounting, was a pioneer in the development of both 
social indicators and “corporate social accounting”.  In the special issue, Parke and 
Petersen (1981) addressed the potential of macro social indicators while Heard and 
Bolce (1981) and Preston (1981) considered corporate social reporting.   In Bauer 
(1966, cited in Glatzer, 1981) the concept of social indicators was “elaborated for the 
first time” (Glatzer, 1981) although Glatzer points out that the same fundamental 
concepts had also received attention from the United Nations in the 1950s.  In the 
current paper we report on a subset of the indicators published annually by the United 
Nations and, like La Porta et al., we consider the entity of interest to be the nation 
state.   
 
Arguably the interest in social indicators, certainly as regards the developed 
economies, reached a high water mark in the 1970s, mirroring, to some extent, 
progressive developments in the field of accounting at that time (see for example, 
ASSC 1975; Burchell et al., 1985).  Soon afterwards, there were fundamental changes 
in the political climate (see, for example, Gray et al. (1995) and since then, at least 
within the “common law” countries, economic metrics have been “regnant” (Diener 
and Suh, 1997) as reflected, we would argue, in the criteria used by La Porta et al.    
 
La Porta’s 1997 analysis revisited with the legal and economic variables juxtaposed 
with social indicators 
 
In this paper we have followed a similar pattern for the presentation of data to that 
used in La Porta et al. (1997).  In Table II of that paper (p. 1138), they listed 49 
countries, grouped by legal origin, and reported empirical measures of financial and 
legal variables with means calculated for each legal origin.  Our equivalent to Table II 
in La Porta et al. (1997a) is Table 2 below; it differs from the La Porta et al. Table II 
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in three ways.  Firstly we have added a number of social indicator variables.  The 
social indicators comprise: the under five child mortality rate (U5MR 01-04); two 
separate measures of income inequality (R10/P10 and the Gini Index); the log of the 
prison population (Log Pr Pop); and the proportion of women in the lower, or a 
single, house of legislators (% Women MPs). These variables are defined in more 
detail in Table 1 Panel A.   
 
Secondly we have restricted the number of countries investigated.  The 49 countries 
considered by La Porta et al. span a very wide range of social and economic 
development.  Had we used the same list of countries, any associations that may exist 
between social indicators and legal origins may well have been masked by the very 
large differences attributable to other factors.  Such masking would be especially 
relevant to health indicators which show gross discrepancies between rich and poor 
countries lying on opposite sides of the “epidemiological transition”4.  Our choice of 
countries is, therefore, a subset of the 49 investigated by La Porta et al. and is based 
on the method adopted by Collison et al. (2007) which investigated child mortality in 
wealthy nations.   
 
Thirdly we have reported in Table 2 only a subset of the indicators from La Porta et 
al. (1997a).  The indicators reported are those from the first four columns of the La 
Porta et al. Table II and they measure various proxies for the vitality of equity markets 
and shareholder protection. This has been done to aid clarity of the exposition. The 
definitions of these variables are reproduced, in summary form, in Table 1 Panel B.  
The rest of the financial/legal variables considered by La Porta et al. (1997a) are 
reproduced in an Annex to this paper (in “Supplement to Table 1B” and “Supplement 
to Table 2”) and they are also included in statistical investigations which are appear 
later in the paper. 
         
It is worth highlighting that La Porta et al. themselves investigated certain social 
indicators in one of their papers (La Porta et al., 1999) which assessed the “quality of 
government”. They argued that the provision of high quality “public good provisions” 
                                                      
4 The epidemiological transition is a significant stage in the relationship between health and economic 
development; it occurs where increased prosperity allows the eradication of many infectious diseases 
and other readily preventable causes of illness and death.   
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which included infant mortality (referring to deaths under 12 months of age), “is a 
sign of a well functioning government” (La Porta et al., 1999, p.226)   In the 
discussion of their results they state: 
Compared to common law countries, French origin countries are sharply 
more interventionist (have higher top rates, less secure property rights, 
and worse regulation).  ...  French origin countries fall behind common 
law countries in public good provision: they have higher infant 
mortality, lower school attainment, higher illiteracy rates and lower 
infrastructure quality. (emphasis added)  (La Porta et al.,1999, p. 261) 
 
La Porta et al. based their analysis of infant mortality on 196 observations meaning 
that they covered countries on both sides of the epidemiological transition, with a 
huge range of development levels, and extremes of per capita average incomes.  
Indeed, the sizable and highly skewed range among infant mortality statistics was 
reflected in La Porta et al. using the log of that particular variable in their analysis.  
Given the child mortality analysis in Collison et al. (2007)  it appears that the La Porta 
et al. analysis was (i) seriously flawed in not adequately acknowledging important 
confounding factors, i.e. in not comparing like with like, and (ii) misleading in 
relation to their flattering assessment of the common law tradition. 
 
By contrast, Collison et al. (2007) considered data from the 24 richest OECD 
countries.  Of those 24, only 22 are included in the current analysis since two, Iceland 
and Luxembourg, were not included in the La Porta et al. study5.  The principal 
findings of the Collison et al. study were: firstly, a very strong association (at the 
0.1% significance level) between income inequality and under-five child mortality 
(for the years 2001-4);  secondly, the discovery that “Anglo-American” countries 
(Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and US) had higher levels of child 
mortality than any of the other 18 countries;  and thirdly, the marked deterioration in 
the relative ranking of the “Anglo-American” countries among the 24 since 1960 
when they had occupied upper and middle positions when the countries were ranked 
in order of increasing child mortality6.    
                                                      
5  The other OECD countries that were excluded from the  Collison et al. study were the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey.  They were omitted since their per capita 
income levels were considerably lower than those of the other countries. While the cut-off point was to 
some extent arbitrary, it did allow a more ‘like with like’ comparison.  
 
6 It should be noted that all countries’ figures had improved in absolute terms over that period.  
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 These findings are entirely consistent with a growing epidemiological literature (see, 
for example, Wilkinson 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006, 2009) which has shown 
that, for the richest countries of the world, higher levels of wealth are not associated 
with improvements in population health; instead, income inequality is significantly 
associated with poor performance across a wide range of social and health indicators.  
Both income inequality, and child mortality featured in La Porta et al., (1999), but no 
reference was made to the relationship between them.  Thus, in setting out the terms 
of their analysis they stated that:  
“As a first step, it is important to agree on what constitutes "good 
government."  We use the term "good" in this article to stand for good-
for-economic-development.   One can alternatively consider good 
government performance to manifest itself in lower inequality …., but 
here we keep the narrow view.”   (p.223) 
 
Given their laudable choice of child mortality as an indicator of good government the 
limitation of their “narrow view”, which lies at the heart of our criticism, is ironically 
apparent. 
 
The basis of the choice of the social indicators listed in Table 1 Panel A, merits some 
explanation.  The results reported in Collison et al. (2007) highlighting the poor 
performance of the Anglo-American countries suggested the possibility of an 
underlying systemic relationship involving poor societal well-being which could be 
linked to income inequality.   The epidemiological literature provides additional 
evidence to support such a proposition (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2008).  Two measures of income inequality were chosen and are  explained in more 
detail in Table 1.  They are the widely used Gini coefficient which takes into account 
income levels across an entire population, and a second, more extreme, measure 
which is a ratio based only on the income received by the top and bottom deciles.   
The child mortality and prison population variables were chosen as examples of 
indicators which previous research had shown to be related to income inequality.  The 
percentage of women MPs was selected since it seemed to be a potential discriminator 
between common and civil law traditions; the former being identified with the 
preservation of established interests.  It seemed plausible that such values could be 
manifested in various ways:  
13 
 
If the mechanics of a particular electoral system exclude to a large 
degree members of a particular ascriptive group (women or otherwise), 
then more often than not that is damning evidence that the system is 
excluding the interests of that particular group from the structures of 
decision-making power. ...Indeed, the degree to which a system 
successfully includes women can indicate a propensity for the system to 
include other disenfranchised minorities. (Reynolds, 1999, p. 549) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Panel A 
Description of the social indicators 
U5MR 01-04 Mean under five child mortality rate for the years 2001-2004 
Source UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children Reports 2003 - 
2006 
R10/P10 The ratio of the income or expenditure share of the richest 10% of 
a population to that of the poorest 10%. Source UN Human 
Development Report (HDR) 2007-08 
Gini Index Gini coefficient of income inequality Source UN HDR 2007-08.  
This measure, unlike the R10/P10 ratio is based on income levels 
for an entire population. 
Log Pr Pop Log of prison population as at January 2007 Source HDR 2007-
08 
% Women MPs  Percentage of Women in lower or single house of legislators as at 
31 May 2007 Source HDR 2007-08 
 
Table 1 Panel B  
Summarised description of the variables reported in Table 1 of La Porta et al. (1997a) 
Origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country source.  
Ext cap/GNP The ratio of the stock market capitalisation held by minorities to gross 
national product in 1994.   
Domestic 
firms/pop 
Ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its 
population (in millions) in 1994 source: emerging market fact book 
and world development report 1996 
IPOs/pop Ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given 
country to its population (in millions) for the period July 1995 to June 
1996.  
AntiDir 
Rights 
An index aggregating shareholder rights.   
Note that the data reported in this table are not all from the same year as each other or as the data 
reported in the La Porta et al. (1997) study.  The figures on child mortality have been taken from the 
Collison et al. (2007) paper for consistency with that set of data.  (It should be noted that more recent 
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child mortality figures  based on the years 2005- 2007 have also been confirmed as showing 
comparable  statistically significant correlations with income inequality (Collison et al.,  2009).  The 
differences in base year relative to the La Porta et al. (1997) study are arguably appropriate in principal 
since one could regard social indicators as being a lagging variable relative to economic indicators.  
However the broad structural differences in socio-economic variables between countries are arguably 
such that the ideal time differences for an examination such as this are moot.  Furthermore we would 
not expect the figures and relationships under consideration  to be very sensitive to such timing issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 External Capital Markets and Social Indicators  
Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table 1 
 
Legal Origin ExtCap
/GNP 
Domestic 
Firms/Pop 
IPOs/ 
Pop 
AntiDir 
Rights 
U5MR 
01-04 
R10/P
10 
Gini 
Index 
Log Pr 
Pop 
% Women 
MPs 
Australia 0.49 63.55  4 6 12.5 35.2 2.10 24.7 
Canada 0.39 40.86 4.93 4 6.5 9.4 32.6 2.03 20.8 
Ireland 0.27 20 0.75 3 6 9.4 34.3 1.86 13.3 
New Zealand 0.28 69 0.66 4 6 12.5 36.2 2.27 32.2 
UK 0.49 35.68 2.01 4 6.5 13.8 36.0 2.09 19.7 
USA 0.39 30.11 3.11 5 8 15.9 40.8 2.87 16.3 
English origin avg 0.50 43.2 2.29 4 6.5 12.3 35.9 2.20 21.2 
* La Porta et al. avg 0.60 35.45 2.23 3.39      
Belgium 0.17 15.5 0.3 0 5.5 8.2 33.0 1.96 34.7 
France 0.23 8.05 0.17 2 5.5 9.1 32.7 1.93 12.2 
Greece 0.07 21.6 0.3 1 5 10.2 34.3 1.95 13 
Italy 0.08 3.91 0.31 0 5.25 11.6 36.0 2.02 17.3 
Netherlands 0.52 21.13 0.66 2 5.5 9.2 30.9 2.11 36.7 
Portugal 0.08 19.5 0.5 2 5.5 15.0 38.5 2.08 21.3 
Spain 0.17 9.71 0.07 2 5.25 10.3 34.7 2.16 36 
French origin avg 0.19 14.2 0.33 1.29 5.36 10.5 34.3 2.03 24.5 
*La Porta et al. avg 0.21 10.00 0.19 1.76      
Austria 0.06 13.87 0.25 2 5 6.9 29.1 2.02 32.2 
Germany 0.13 5.14 0.08 1 5 6.9 28.3 1.98 31.6 
Japan 0.62 17.78 0.26 3 4.5 4.5 24.9 1.79 9.4 
Korea, Rep of 0.44 15.88 0.02 2 5.25 7.8 31.6 1.99 13.4 
Switzerland 0.62 33.85  1 5.5 9.0 33.7 1.92 25 
German origin avg 0.37 17.304 0.1525 1.8 5.05 7.0 29.5 1.94 22.3 
*La Porta et al. avg 0.46 16.79 0.12 2.00      
Denmark          0.21 50.4 1.8 3 4.25 8.1 24.7 1.89 36.9 
Finland          0.25 13 0.6 2 4.75 5.6 26.9 1.88 42 
Norway           0.22 33 4.5 3 4 6.1 25.8 1.82 37.9 
Sweden           0.51 12.66 1.66 2 3.25 6.2 25.0 1.91 47.3 
Scandinavian avg 0.30 27.26 2.14 2.5 4.06 6.5 25.6 1.87 41.0 
*La Porta et al. avg 0.30 27.26 2.14 2.5      
*Means reported for the original, and larger, groups of countries reported in La Porta et al., (1997a) 
 
 
The statistical significance of the relationships between social indicators and legal 
origin and between social indicators and some of the specific measures related to 
investor protection used by La Porta et al. are examined in some detail below.  But a 
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number of striking patterns emerge from a visual inspection of the mean statistics for 
the social indicators chosen.  It is not surprising in the light of the results from 
Collison et al. (2007) that the common law (i.e. English origin) countries have the 
worst child mortality figures since the common law countries within the OECD 
constitute the group more usually referred to as the Anglo-American countries.  
Similarly the position of the common law countries with respect to inequality is 
consistent with the Collison et al. results.  The common law countries also have the 
largest mean prison population in the OECD and this result too is consistent with 
findings reported by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) that “more unequal countries have 
higher rates of imprisonment than more equal countries” (p.148).   
 
The association of income inequality with a range of social ills is reflected in the 
consistent ranking of the legal origin groups across the income inequality, child 
mortality and prison population indicators.  In each case the Scandinavian countries 
perform best, followed by the German group. The French group is consistently ranked 
third while the common law countries are consistently ranked at the bottom.  
 
The final social indicator, percentage of women MPs, is of a different type to the 
others but, as discussed above may be considered as a proxy for the progression of the 
democratic impulse and so could be construed as having features in common with the 
other measures.  This indicator again shows, we would argue, the worst performance 
being found amongst the common law countries (in aggregate) although admittedly, 
there appears to be little difference between the three non-Scandinavian groups.   
Close inspection reveals that the results are influenced by a few outliers.  In the 
German group, the Asian nations have low figures which may be accounted for by 
differing cultural traditions. Were these to be removed, a rather different gradation of 
means would be apparent.  However the figures for France, Greece and Ireland are all 
also relatively low.  A cultural/historical examination of possible explanations for 
these figures goes beyond the scope of this paper, but we would venture that, prima 
facie, the common law countries, in aggregate, seem to have progressed less far on the 
journey towards representative democracy and pluralism than their civil law 
counterparts.   
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The next part of this section presents a more rigorous statistical examination of the 
data in Table 2 (and the rest of the La Porta et al data which appears in the Annex to 
this paper) but it already appears that, compared to the civil law countries, the 
common-law tradition is associated with greater inequality and a relatively 
conservative approach to social development. 
 
Statistical analysis 
The empirical analysis in this section of the paper has a number of parts. Initially, the 
social indicator variables (U5 01-04, R10/P10, Gini Index, Log PR Pop and % 
Women MPs) are examined for each of the legal-tradition categories which La Porta 
et al. derive. Specifically, the mean (median) of each of the social indicators is 
calculated for all four legal tradition groupings of countries and a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean (medians) were equal is conducted. The second empirical 
component of the current article examines the relationships that exist between the 
various proxies for investor protection which La Porta et al. employ when grouping 
countries and the social indicators examined in the current investigation. In particular, 
correlation analysis is used to study the sign and size of any relationships that may be 
present. The third empirical part of the analysis distils the information in the 10 
investor protection proxy variables, used by La Porta et al., into a number of principle 
components and regresses these components on the social indicators for the developed 
countries considered in the current study. In this way, a comprehensive investigation 
is undertaken to determine whether certain investor protection proxy variables and 
some legal tradition groupings of countries are associated with better indicators of 
social health and development such as under 5 mortality, measures of income 
inequality, the size of the prison population or the representation of women among 
elected members of a country’s parliament. 
 
The initial investigation focused on whether the five social indicator variables being 
considered varied across the four groupings of countries from La Porta et al. based on 
legal traditions. The results from this analysis are shown in Table 3. The top half of 
this table reports the findings from an analysis of means while the bottom half 
documents the results for an investigation of the median values for each of the social 
indicator variables; the median analysis is reported because some of the descriptive 
statistics in Table 2 suggested that the variables might not be normally distributed. In 
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the top half of the table, the mean value of each social indicator together with its 
standard deviation is provided for all four legal traditions. An F-statistic and its p-
value are then reported for a test of the null hypothesis that these means were equal. 
In the bottom half of the paper, median values and their associated Z-statistics are 
provided for each of the four groupings of countries and an H-statistic together with 
its p-value is shown for the null hypothesis that these median values were equal.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
An analysis of Table 3 reveals that sizeable differences exist in the measures of social 
health across the four groupings of countries based on La Porta et al.’s classification 
scheme. In particular, the mean level of under five child mortality in countries where 
the legal tradition has an English common law origin (mean = 6.500) is 60 per cent 
higher than in Scandinavian countries (mean = 4.063). A similar picture emerges from 
the other four social indicator variables considered. Specifically, countries where the 
legal system is based on an English common law tend to have the greatest income 
inequality (according to both the R10/P10 and Gini Index variables), the highest 
average prison populations and smallest percentage of Women MPs. The 
Scandinavian countries perform best. In between, the countries where the legal 
tradition is based on German Law are ranked second while those where the legal 
origin is French in character are ranked third7.  
 
A more detailed inspection of Table 3 reveals that there is some variability within the 
country groupings for the social indicator variables being studied. In particular, some 
of the standard deviation figures were large. This seems to be especially the case for 
English common law countries (Legal Origin 1) where the standard deviation values 
were highest for three of the five social indicator variables being examined. For 
example, the standard deviation value of the Log PR Pop variable for Legal Origin 1 
countries of 0.352 is nearly 4 times as large as the next highest standard deviation 
number. By contrast, Scandinavian countries (Legal Origin 4) tend to be much more 
                                                      
7 Strictly speaking, the ranking for the final social indicator variable (% Women MPs) is the opposite to 
that for the other four where a high number is better than a low number; for the other four variables, a 
larger number indicates a higher level of child mortality, a greater level of income inequality and a 
greater prison population.    
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homogenous in terms of the social indicator variables since the standard deviation 
values are smallest for four of the five measures being examined.  
 
Despite this variability within groupings, the picture that emerges from Table 3 is that 
a consistent pattern exists in terms of the rankings of the country groupings according 
to their social indicator variables. The F-statistics confirm that the mean values for 
each social indicator are not equal across the four country groupings. All of the F-
statistics were large and statistically significant at the 10 per cent levels; indeed, four 
of the p-values are less than the critical value of 0.05. This finding is confirmed by an 
analysis of the median values and their corresponding H-statistics. For all five social 
indicator variables the rankings of country groupings based on median values are 
identical to those based on their mean counterparts. Further, the null hypothesis that 
the medians are equal across the four country groupings can be rejected for four of the 
five social indicator variables; the exception to this general finding related to the Log 
PR Pop where the H-statistic is only 9.32 and its p-value is 0.25. 
 
The Spearman correlations8 (a) among the investor protection and legal origin 
variables and (b) between the investor protection as well as legal origin variables and 
the social indicator measures are displayed in Table 4. Based on the results from 
Table 2, one would expect the correlation findings to confirm that a relationship exists 
between the legal origin of a country and its social indicators. However, this table 
goes further by examining whether a relationship exists between (i) the investor 
protection measures on which the legal origin grouping is based and (ii) the social 
indicator variables. Further, the table highlights whether there are correlations among 
the different investor protection measures which La Porta et al. employ or whether 
each one is capturing a different aspect of the legal origin grouping used by La Porta 
et al. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
A visual inspection of Table 4 reveals that there is a strong negative association 
between: under-5 child mortality; income inequality; as well as the size of prison 
                                                      
8 The non-parametric Spearman rank correlation analysis was selected because there was some 
evidence that the variables being examined were not normally distributed. In fact, descriptive statistics 
revealed that data for one of the social indicators and six of the investor protection variables were 
positively skewed. In addition, there was some evidence of kurtosis in the data series. However, an 
analysis of the parametric Pearson correlation coefficients revealed very little difference in the values 
calculated. 
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population; and whether the legal origin of the countries being studied is based on 
English common law (Legal Origin 1). In addition, the association between the % of 
Women MPs and legal origin is positive, consistent with the figures showing that 
Scandinavian countries have a much larger representation of female elected 
representatives in their Parliament relative to their common law counterparts. When 
the investor protection variables were examined, however, relatively few of the 
correlations were statistically significant; in fact only six correlation values have p-
values of less than 0.05: Anti Dir and U5 01-04, FirmsPop and U5 01-04, GDP 
Growth and % Women MPs, Log GNP and % Women MPs, 1s1vote and % Women 
MPs, Rule of Law and % Women MPs. The remaining 44 correlations in the bottom 
panel of Table 5 are not statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent level.  
 
In the top half of Table 4, there is some evidence that the investor protection variables 
are correlated with one another. Of the 45 correlation values calculated, 12 were 
statistically significant: ExCapGNP and AntiDir, ExCapGNP and FirmsPop, 
ExCapGNP and IPOsPop, ExCapGNP and Debt/GNP, AntiDir and FirmsPop, 
AntiDir and IPOsPop, FirmsPop and IPOsPop, 1s1Vote and IPOsPop, Debt/GNP and 
Log GNP, GDP Growth and 1s1vote, GDP Growth and Rule of Law, 1s1vote and 
Rule of Law. Such a result is hardly surprising since many of the variables were 
constructed from a common component (e.g. GNP) while all were presumably 
selected by La Porta et al. because they helped to paint a picture about one issue 
(namely the protection of investor rights) within a country. All of these significant 
correlations had the expected signs. For example, it is not surprising that the 
correlation between ExCapGNP and Anti Dir is positive at 0.522 since one would 
expect the index value aggregating shareholders rights in a country to be high where 
the ratio of the capitalisation held be minorities to GNP to be high.  
 
Since there is some evidence of a relationship among the investor protection variables 
from La Porta et al. studies, it was decided to use a statistical approach to take account 
of this correlation before examining the association between social indicators and the 
investor protection variables using regression analysis9.  
                                                      
9 In fact, a regression of the social indicator variables on all of the investor protection measures and the 
legal origin dummy variables indicated that multicollinearity was present in the data. For example, 
when U5 01-04 was the dependant variable, five of the independent variables had variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) that were greater than 10. Thus, PCA was employed to overcome this problem.  
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To examine the possible relationship between indicators of social performance and 
the various investor protection variables in the La Porta et al. studies, PCA was 
employed to identify relevant factors from the pool of data under consideration. PCA 
is a method which significantly reduces the number of variables from p to a much 
smaller set of k derived orthogonal variables that retain most of the information in the 
original p variables. The k derived variables which maximise the variance accounted 
for in the original variables are called principal components (PCs). After applying this 
analysis to the data series of each of the developed countries being studied, the 
dominant PCs are then extracted and used as inputs into a regression analysis to seek 
to explain the social indicators included in the study. The use of PCA is appealing for 
a number of reasons. First, it allows a large number of theoretically important factors 
that may affect the social indicators to be considered and second, it can be used 
effectively in conjunction with multiple regression analysis by addressing the 
problems of multicollinearity; specifically, because the k derived variables are 
orthogonal to each other multicollinearity should not be present.10 
 
Table 5 summarises the results from applying PCA to the investor protection variables 
considered in the La Porta et al. papers. In particular, the bottom part of Table 5 
details the eigenvalues and proportions of variance explained by the PCs, while the 
top part of Table 5 summarises the factor loadings for the dominant PCs. The data in 
Table 5 clearly shows that across all 20 countries examined, the bulk of the variability 
in the original 10 investor protection variables can be explained by 4 PCs. For 
example, the variance, or eigenvalue, of the first PC is 3.027. It explains 30.3 per cent 
of the total variance of the 10 investor protection variables. The second PC has an 
eigenvalue of 2.291 and accounts for 22.9 per cent of total variance of the 10 
variables. The third and fourth PCs also have eigenvalues greater than 1.000 and 
explain 17.0 and 11.3 per cent and account for 17.0 an 11.3 per cent of the variability 
in the investor protection measures across the different countries. The proportion of 
                                                      
10 Factor analysis (FA) is a very similar technique to PCA and it could have been employed to identify 
the fundamental investor protection variables that are important in explaining the social indicator 
measures. The defining characteristic that distinguishes between the two techniques is that, with PCA, 
all the variability in an item is used in the analysis, while in FA, only the variability in an item that is 
common with other items is used. PCA was used to identify the important factors in this paper as it is 
the preferred method for data reduction, while FA is preferred when the objective of the analysis is to 
detect structure. In most cases, however, the two methods yield very similar results (Hill and Lewicki, 
2006). 
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variance explained by the remaining 6 PCs is relatively low and their eigenvalues are 
all small.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The Kaiser criterion was used to select the PCs which should be used as inputs for the 
regression analysis. The criterion recommends that only those PCs with eigenvalues 
greater than or equal to 1, should be retained (Kaiser 1960). Jolliffe (1972) has 
suggested a cut-off point of 0.7. However, in this instance, Jolliffe’s criterion results 
in the same number of components being retained as Kaiser’s criterion of the 
eigenvalue being greater than or equal to 1 (Dunteman 1994). Therefore, the adoption 
of these criteria led to the retention of 4 PCs. Together, these four PCs account for 
81.5 per cent of the variance in the investor protection variables. Therefore, the 
dimensionality of the dataset can be reduced from 10 to 4. 
 
The values in top half of Table 5 indicate the factor loadings of the PCs that are 
identified from the data. In particular, the top half of the table therefore highlights the 
variables that have large coefficients of either sign in each PC vector11. The first PC, 
which is shown in column 2, has high positive correlations with AntiDir, Rule of Law 
and IPOsPop and negative correlations with GDP Growth as well as 1s1Vote. This PC 
primarily reflects strong shareholder rights and a vibrant new issue market; it is 
labelled “Outsider Capitalism” in the current analysis. The second PC shows large 
negative co-efficients for ExCapGNP, GDPGrowth and 1s1Vote and can be 
interpreted as small stock market/ low growth variable. We label this PC “Insider 
Capitalism” in the remainder of the paper. The largest co-efficients for the third PC 
are positive for FirmsPop and negative for GDP Growth as well as Debt/GNP. This 
can be interpreted as a large stock market/ low growth/low debt variable; as a result, 
we label this PC as the “Small Economy” variable. The fourth PC is mainly 
associated with strong “Creditor Rights”. 
                                                      
11 PCA is subject to a number of limitations. One limitation of the method is that it can often be 
difficult to interpret the principal components. This situation typically arises when several variables in 
the PC vectors have large coefficients of either sign (Dunteman, 1994). However, this limitation was 
not a concern in the current analysis as, in each market, the identity of the high loading variables in 
each PC vector was very clear. A second limitation of the technique is that the choice of how many 
PCs to extract for further analysis is subjective, although the PCs will explain most of the variation in 
the original factors; they may not be useful in explaining the dependant variable (Brooks 2002). That 
is, and in terms of the current analysis, although the PCs will explain most of the variation in the 
original economic and fundamental factors, they may not be the most useful as explanations of 
emerging market share returns. 
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In the final part of the empirical analysis, the dominant PCs together with Legal 
Origin variables are used as inputs to a regression analysis in order to explain the 
social indicator variables of the 22 developed countries included in this study12. Five 
regression models are considered. First, the under 5 child mortality figures of the 
sample countries are regressed on each of the four PCs as well as three dummy 
variables representing legal origin (Legal Origin 2 (French), Legal Origin 3 (German) 
and Legal Origin 4 (Scandinavian)); a variable was not added for Legal Origin 1 
(English) as the regression equation would have been over-specified. Instead, the 
impact of Legal Origin 1 is accounted for the in constant term: all of the other co-
efficients need to be interpreted relative to the level of U5 01-04 in English common 
law countries13. Four similar regression equations were estimated for the other social 
indicator variables. These regression models took the form: 
 
SIsi = β0 + β1PC1i + β2PC2i + β3PC3i + β4PC4i + β5LO2 + β6LO3 + β7LO4 + εi    (1) 
 
where SIsi is the social indicator s for country i (s = U5 Child Mortality 01-04, 
R10/P10, Gini index, Log PR Pop and % Women MPs), PCi is principal component 
for country i, LO is the Legal Origin dummy variable for French (LO2), German 
(LO3) and Scandinavian (LO4) legal traditions. Finally, εi is a random error term. 
 
 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (1)14. In particular, the table 
details the co-efficient of each PC and Legal Origin variable, with their corresponding 
p-values. The adjusted R²s for the 5 regressions are also shown. An inspection of 
Table 6 suggests that a significant relationship exists between some of the social 
indicator measures and the PC as well as legal origin variables. The strongest and 
most significant associations are between under 5 child mortality as well as income 
inequality and legal origin variables. For example, the co-efficients for the legal origin 
                                                      
12 In fact, the regression results reported in this paper relate to data for 20 of the 22 countries since 
IPOsPop information was missing for Australia and Switzerland. However, imputing values for these 
two missing observations and thereby increasing the sample up to 22 countries does not alter either the 
PCA results of the regression findings. 
13 A regression was also run where one dummy variable was added depending on whether the country 
had an English common law tradition (value = 1), or not (value = 0). In this instance, the dummy 
variable had the following co-efficients: 2.237 (p=0.000) for U5 01-04; 5.124 (p=0.038) for R10/P10; 
10.498 (p=0.003) for the Gini Index; 0.256 (p=0.142) for Log PR Pop; and -16.143 (p=0.013) for % 
Women MPs. 
14 Although not shown in Table 6, the VIFs for all of the variables were less than 5.0 suggesting that 
multicollinearity was not problematic in these regression equations. 
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variables are negative for the U5 01-04 equation suggesting that under 5 child 
mortality is lower in countries which don’t have an English common law tradition; for 
those countries with a German or Scandinavian legal tradition, the co-efficients are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. A similar picture emerges for the Gini 
index equation where Legal Origin 3 and Legal Origin 4 dummy variables have co-
efficients of -9.068 and -10.810 with p-values of 0.020 and 0.000 respectively. For the 
R10/P10 (% Women MPs) variable, only the co-efficient for the Legal Origin 4 
countries is statistically negative (positive) at the 5 per cent level.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
An inspection of the co-efficients on the PC variables indicates that only one 
significant value is observed. The Creditor Rights variable (PC4) is positively 
associated the percentage of Women MPs in a country (co-efficient = 4.244, p-value = 
0.025). However, this may simply reflect the fact that in Scandinavian countries, 
creditor rights are protected to a greater extent and a larger percentage of MPs are 
women. None of the other PC measures constructed from the investor protection 
variables employed in La Porta et al. can significantly explain the social indicators of 
the countries being studied.  
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that three of the regression equations have relatively 
high explanatory power. Specifically, for the U5 01-04, Gini index and % Women 
MPs, the R2 values are 0.71, 0.65 and 0.63 respectively. The only equation with a 
very low level of explanatory power is where Log PR Pop is the dependant variable; 
in this instance, the R2 is only 0.05 and none of the co-efficient values are statistically 
different from zero. 
 
Common and Civil Law Traditions and Corporate Law 
Reference to the work of Berle and Means is a recurring theme in a number of the La 
Porta et al papers (see, especially, La Porta et al. 1999).  That theme is the need to 
reappraise a common image of corporate structures, stemming from Berle and Means 
classic analysis, which focuses on the agency conflict between ownership and control.  
They state that “Our results present a different picture of the ownership structure of a 
modern corporation than that suggested by Berle and Means and widely accepted in 
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the finance literature.” (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 502). And La Porta et al (2008) state 
that:  
“The last decade has witnessed an explosion of research on corporate 
governance that uses the investor protection framework. This research 
has successfully replaced the traditional Berle–Means conception of a 
public corporation with a much more realistic for most of the world 
model of family-run firms, pyramidal and group structures, and 
tremendous conflicts between outside investors and controlling 
shareholders. (p. 287). 
 
However there is another, more fundamental, insight of Berle and Means on which La 
Porta et al appear to be silent, and which is an explicit critique of the common law 
tradition and its implications for corporate governance.   That analysis, we will argue, 
is consistent with an expectation that societal well being will be better in civil law 
rather than common law countries.  
 
In their discussion of “The traditional logic of property”, Berle and Means (1932, 
Book Four, Chapter 1), refer to legal, economic and social issues “which must now be 
squarely faced”.  The most important issue that they identify is “who should receive 
the profits of industry”, in other words, should large companies be run in the interests 
of the “owners” or others? Berle and Means place quotation marks around the word 
“owners” to indicate the problematic issue of identifying the meaning of, and the 
rights attaching to, ownership of large and publicly important enterprises.  They assert 
that under common law, the traditional logic of property requires that the entire profit 
be awarded to the shareholders.  They discuss the historical development of the law 
pertaining to property when power to manage assets was delegated to others.  The 
dominant tradition is that those with delegated rights to control assets owned by 
others do so as fiduciaries.  They follow their examination of such developments by 
stating  
“Underlying all this is the ancient preoccupation of the common law 
with the rights of property.  Primarily, the common law did not 
undertake to set up ideal schemes of government.  It aimed to protect 
men in their own.” (Berle and Means, 1932, p.296). 
 
This legal tradition is subjected to a critical reappraisal by Berle and Means.  In this 
exercise they address fundamental questions arising from the separation of ownership 
and control.  However their interest in this question was not confined to the classic 
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agency problem with which they are closely associated - they were much more 
concerned with the significance for wider society of the operation of large 
corporations.   
 
They reason that the nature of the modern corporation “calls for analysis, not in terms 
of business enterprise but in terms of social organization” because the corporation has 
become a site of highly centralized power in which many interests are at stake.    
Their discussion then centres on the historical process by which power is challenged – 
as happened in relation to the absolute religious power once wielded by the church, 
and the slow process by which constitutional law developed in the political context.   
Berle and Means do not predict how this essentially political question, of how the 
diverse groups which  have an interest in the operation of the corporation will resolve 
their interests; but they do take a normative, as well as an analytic  perspective in 
considering future possibilities.   
 
They consider that the owners of passive property, having given up the role of 
managing their resources, have also given up the right to have the entity operated in 
their interest15.  But they are also emphatic that the elimination of the “sole interest of 
the passive owner” does not mean that the controlling group should take over the 
same right: they conclude that neither “the claims of ownership nor those of control 
can stand against the paramount interests of the community”.  They recognize that 
institutional and political accommodations will need to be fashioned, but hold that: 
“When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out 
and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of 
today must yield before the larger interests of society.”  (p.312). 
 
They envisage courts having to moderate their traditional position on property rights 
by whichever “legal theories they might choose” to recognize what Berle and Means 
see as a social imperative.  They base this imperative on a continuing historical 
process whereby concentrated power is forced to accede to the wider interests of the 
polity.  (see also Engelen, 2002 and Gomez and Korine, 2005).  They argue that:  
                                                      
15 In the General Theory, Keynes (1936) famously went somewhat further than Berle and Means in his 
disdain for rewarding the passive investor.  He advocated (metaphorically) “the euthanasia of the 
rentier, of the functionless investor” (p.235) and the consequent “euthanasia of the cumulative 
oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value of capital”. 
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“It is conceivable, - indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate 
system is to survive, - that the “control” of the great corporations should 
develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims 
by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of 
the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private 
cupidity”. (p.313).16   
 
They go on to reiterate the point about the historical imperative whereby power is and 
should be challenged whenever it becomes too concentrated – and with great 
prescience they foresee the potential for corporations to become so powerful that they 
can dominate the state.  This reinforces their central point that the control of such 
organisations should become a matter of constitutional reform in the wider democratic 
and public interest, rather than a vehicle for promoting the interest of powerful 
groups.    
 
Their views of the differing characteristics of a legal framework which aims to 
balance the interests of all members of society, and the common law which merely 
seeks to defend “men in their own” are, we submit, of great salience given the 
evidence adduced in this paper of the wider societal impacts which are associated 
with legal traditions. 
 
Conclusion 
Our conclusion to this paper can be stated succinctly. Following the thrust of the 
Berle and Means analysis we contend that the common law tradition leads to the 
spurious depoliticisation of issues that are central to political mediation.  And we have 
adduced evidence that it leads to social outcomes, relative to those found in countries 
with a civil law tradition, which should give profound cause for concern and prompt 
the question of how such outcomes could be ameliorated.  And in this context, we 
believe that the wide influence of the work of La Porta et al. is a matter for concern.  
Shleifer (2002) asserts that:  
“The evidence identifies no benefits of the more interventionist 
institutions [of civil law countries] for economic or social outcomes.  To 
the contrary, French legal origin typically is associated with worse 
public sector outcomes” (p.3). 
 
                                                      
16 For a vigorous and well known challenge to such a governance philosophy, see Jensen (2001).   
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 And, perhaps even more worryingly that 
 
“In the years ahead, institutional reform may become one of the key strategies for 
improving human welfare.” (p.5) 
 
We also note that much of the analysis and evidence, produced by La Porta et al., on 
the relationship between varieties of capitalism, including legal traditions and related 
forms of corporate governance, is of great significance and potential importance.  
Unfortunately their “narrow view”, which may have appeal to some investors, has 
obscured the really important implications of their work for wider society.  
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Table 3 An Analysis of the Social Indicator Variables According to a Country’s Legal Origin 
 
Legal 
Origin 
U5 01‐04 
  
R10/P10 
  
Gini Index 
  
Log PR POP 
  
% Women MPs 
 
   Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev 
1  6.500  0.775  12.250  2.534  35.850  2.758  2.203  0.352  21.167  6.664 
2  5.357  0.197  10.514  2.256  34.300  2.466  2.030  0.089  24.457  11.036 
3  5.050  0.371  7.020  1.651  29.520  3.347  1.939  0.090  22.320  10.457 
4  4.063  0.625  6.500  1.098  25.600  0.983  1.874  0.040  41.025  4.730 
                      
F statistic  18.18  9.28  15.73  2.72  4.64 
p‐value  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.01 
                      
                     
Legal 
Origin 
U5 01‐04 
  
R10/P10 
  
Gini Index 
  
Log PR POP 
  
% Women MPs 
 
   Median  Z statistic  Median  Z statistic  Median  Z statistic  Median  Z statistic  Median  Z statistic 
1  6.250  3.540  12.500  2.730  35.600  2.430  2.097  1.990  20.250  ‐1.220 
2  5.500  0.180  10.200  1.450  34.300  1.450  2.017  1.020  21.300  ‐0.530 
3  5.000         ‐1.210  6.900 ‐2.230  29.100 ‐1.610  1.978 ‐0.980  25.000 ‐0.940 
4  4.125       ‐2.980  6.150 ‐2.470  25.400 ‐2.810  1.881 ‐2.470  39.950  3.060 
                      
H statistic  17.86  15.70  14.19  9.32  9.64 
p‐value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.02 
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Table 4 Correlation Analysis 
 
 
  
Legal 
Origin  ExCapGNP  AntiDir  FirmsPop  IPOsPop  CredR  Debt/GNP 
GDP 
Growth  Log GNP  1s1vote 
Rule of 
Law 
Legal origin  1.000                     
ExCapGNP                     ‐0.1.86  1.000
AntiDir  ‐                  0.423*  0.522*  1.000
FirmsPop                 ‐0.364*  0.425*  0.671*  1.000
IPOsPop  ‐              0.222  0.413*  0.656*  0.688*  1.000
CredR  0.238               ‐0.030  0.016  0.004 ‐0.126  1.000
Debt/GNP  ‐              0.168  0.481*  0.311 ‐0.032 ‐0.186  0.226  1.000
GDP Growth                   ‐0.148 ‐0.129  0.162 ‐0.164 ‐0.214 ‐0.139 ‐0.011  1.000
Log GNP  ‐        0.125  0.336  0.040 ‐0.307  0.181  0.050  0.557*  0.186  1.000
1s1vote  0.162  0.063           ‐0.119 ‐0.031 ‐0.413*  0.066 ‐0.023  0.313  0.073  1.000
Rule of Law  0.096  0.260  0.208  0.273  0.441*       ‐0.096  0.216 ‐0.382* ‐0.056 ‐0.503*  1.000 
                        
U5 Mortality 01/04     ‐0.912*  0.349  0.418*  0..416*  0.219 ‐0.266  0.248  0.056  0.179 ‐0.285  0.065 
R10/P10         ‐0.838*  0.036  0.293  0.350  0.206 ‐0.204 ‐0.003  0.009  0.035 ‐0.240 ‐0.207 
Gini Index           ‐0.801* ‐0.007  0.146  0.199 ‐0.029 ‐0.243  0.037  0.044  0.006 ‐0.188 ‐0.200 
LOG PR Pop     ‐0.649*  0.049  0.248  0.199  0.019  0.130  0.336 ‐0.027  0.214 ‐0.261  0.088 
% Women MPs  0.484*           ‐0.112 ‐0.093  0.012  0.285  0.300 ‐0.172 ‐0.417* ‐0.368* ‐0.533*  0.553* 
 
 
Note: This table shows the Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables included in the analysis. The top half of the table displays the correlation coefficients among 
the investor protection and legal origin variables while the bottom half of the table shows the correlation between the social indicators and the La Porta et al. variables. An 
explanation of the variables is provided in Table 1 and an * indicates significance at the 1 per cent level for a one‐tail test. 
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Table 5 A Principal Component Analysis of the La Porta et al. Investor Protection Variables 
 
 
Variable  PC1  PC2  PC3  PC4  PC5  PC6  PC7  PC8  PC9  PC10 
ExCapGNP  0.326  ‐0.438 0.002 ‐0.012 ‐0.034 0.272  0.715 0.228 ‐0.112 ‐0.225
AntiDir  0.454  ‐0.184 0.283 ‐0.187 ‐0.223 ‐0.230  0.044 ‐0.339 ‐0.122 0.641
FirmsPop  0.369  0.051 0.489 0.217 ‐0.284 0.045  ‐0.320 ‐0.166 ‐0.164 ‐0.579
IPOsPop  0.401  0.065 0.246 ‐0.402 0.525 0.147  ‐0.194 0.247 0.466 ‐0.023
CredR  0.104  ‐0.229 0.077 0.792 0.440 0.148  ‐0.123 ‐0.005 0.007 0.271
Debt/GNP  0.233  ‐0.391 ‐0.401 0.152 ‐0.282 ‐0.451  ‐0.189 0.127 0.504 ‐0.140
GDP Growth  ‐0.257  ‐0.409 0.274 ‐0.158 0.389 ‐0.593  ‐0.040 0.119 ‐0.342 ‐0.179
Log GNP  0.118  ‐0.377 ‐0.469 ‐0.265 0.194 0.339  ‐0.361 ‐0.412 ‐0.294 ‐0.121
1s1vote  ‐0.288  ‐0.409 0.249 ‐0.104 ‐0.362 0.372  ‐0.362 0.474 ‐0.016 0.227
Rule of Law  0.403  0.292 ‐0.311 0.032 ‐0.002 ‐0.136  ‐0.180 0.566 ‐0.521 0.107
                                
                                
Eigenvalue  3.027  2.291 1.696 1.132 0.546 0.447  0.359 0.283 0.130 0.090
Proportion  0.303  0.229 0.170 0.113 0.055 0.045  0.036 0.028 0.013 0.009
Cumulative  0.303  0.532 0.701 0.815 0.869 0.914  0.950 0.978 0.991 1.000
 
 
Note: This table shows the output from applying a principal component analysis to the investor protection variables in the La Porta et al. study. The top part of 
the  table  shows  the weightings  for  the 10  investor protection variables of each PC. The bottom part of  the  table highlights  the  importance of each PC  in 
explaining the investor protection variables. 
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Table 6 Regression Results 
 
 
  
U5 01‐04 
  
R10/P10 
  
Gini Index 
  
Log PR POP 
  
% Women MPs 
 
Predictor  β   β   p‐value p‐value β  p‐value β  p‐value β  p‐value
Constant  6.468  0.000  11.608  0.000  36.869  0.000  2.134  0.000  19.319  0.002 
PC1  0.069  0.606  0.235  0.683  ‐0.494  0.470  0.0489  0.375  1.964  0.268 
PC2       ‐0.027  0.818 ‐0.256  0.611 ‐0.115  0.846 ‐0.009  0.845  2.508  0.114 
PC3     ‐0.049  0.710  0.209  0.715 ‐0.024  0.971 ‐0.010  0.858  ‐1.713  0.498 
PC4     ‐0.154  0.252  0.277  0.623 ‐0.008  0.991 ‐0.020  0.704  4.244  0.025 
LO2       ‐1.065  0.092 ‐0.533  0.835 ‐3.083  0.317 ‐0.051  0.835  6.015  0.440 
LO3       ‐1.452  0.049 ‐5.335  0.087 ‐9.068  0.020 ‐0.152  0.585  5.670  0.522 
LO4       ‐2.397  0.000 ‐5.100  0.016 ‐10.81  0.000 ‐0.278  0.134  18.261  0.006 
                      
R2  0.71                   0.43 0.65 0.05 0.63
 
Note: This table displays the coefficients (βs) and their p‐values for the five regressions undertaken. PC1 to PC4 represent the PCs extracted from the investor 
protection variables while LO2, LO3 and LO4 are dummy variables representing the French, German and Scandinavian legal origins respectively. LO1 was not 
included in order to avoid over‐specifying the equation. R2 refers to the adjusted R2 of the regression equation. 
 
 
 
